I. The AA Model
The economy is populated by a measure 1 continuum of individuals i ∈ [0, 1], who live for two periods: in the first period the individuals accumulate capital; in the middle of their lives the taxes are set; in the second period, individuals exert effort (work). Total pretax lifetime income is (1)
where A is talent, k is the capital accumulated during the first period, e is effort during the second period, η is "noise" or "luck", and α ∈ (0, 1) is a technological constant. The government imposes a flat tax rate τ on income and redistributes the proceeds in a lump sum fashion, so that the individual's consumption is, for govern-
where u i is private utility from own consumption, investment and effort, β i is an impatience parameter, γ is "distaste for unfair outcomes," and Ω is a measure of the social injustice in the economy. AA assume that A, η, and β are i.i.d. across agents, and that for δ = A 2 β, Cov(δ, η) = 0. We let 
2 , where u i is the actual level of private utility, and  u i is a measure of the "fair" level of utility the individual should have (deserves) on the basis of his talent and effort. They define
The individual chooses k when taxes haven't been set, so anticipating a tax rate of τ e (which will be equal to the actual τ in equilibrium), he maximizes
with respect to k, and using the actual tax rate in equation (3) maximizes with respect to e to obtain (4) We now present an example with no noise, no luck, and therefore a constant noiseto-signal ratio, that still has multiple equilibria.
, and σ η 2 = 0. We first note that 
This means, in principle, but we will now check it, that given an expected tax rate of τ e j for j = l, m, h, the tax rate that maximizes the utility of the voter with the median values of the shocks is τ e j ; that is, there is multiplicity of equilibria, even though luck plays no role.
We now check that given a tax rate of τ e l the tax rate that maximizes the utility of the individual with the median values of the shocks is again τ = τ e l (the cases of τ e m and τ e h are similar and omitted). First note that the optimal tax rates for we still have U m (1, τ e l ) < U m (0, τ e l ) < U m ( τ e l , τ e l ). Therefore, the tax τ ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes
, so we only need to check that it is the global maximum among τ ∈ [0, 1] which is ensured by concavity in the domain:
B. Discussion
Note that with no luck in the model, σ η 2 = 0, for τ e = τ we obtain that for σ  y 2 the variance of "fair" income (the signal in AA), Ω = τ
which is nonmonotonic in τ, while one might expect unfairness to increase with taxes. 1 Hence, it is possible that the key insights in AA can be restored if other definitions of what is fair are used. For example, one alternative definition involves keeping taxes in the definition of fair consumption (in AA "fair" consumption involves no taxes and no luck).
2 Alesina and Cozzi (2012) analyze multiplicity using another approach where the AA preferences are normalized by average income. Another possibility would be to insist that the effort imputed in "fair" consumption takes into account that there are no taxes. In other words, it may be more reasonable to modify AA so that the k i and e i used to substitute into  y i in equation (2), are not those associated to the case where taxes may be positive. Finally, one may also insist on preferences for fairness that are consistent with the empirical evidence. For example, Levine (1998) and Rotemberg (2008) demonstrate that preferences for "reciprocal altruism" are consistent with the available evidence from the ultimatum games, while Di Tella and Dubra (2010) show that they lead to multiplicity in an economy similar to that presented in AA.
One difficulty for exploring these conjectures in the AA framework is that a counterexample to the main theorem can be produced because AA claim that the individual with the median values of the shocks is the median voter, but in general he is not. In the online Appendix we give an example where the equilibrium tax rate, the one preferred by the median voter, is not the one identified in AA. The tax rate identified as the equilibrium in AA would be defeated in voting by the one preferred by the median voter (which can be shown to be a Condorcet winner, even if the median voter theorem does not apply). This wedge between the prediction of the AA model and what would happen in that economy is relevant, since it is currently not known if in the AA model multiplicity can arise when the equilibrium tax rate is one that, when anticipated, maximizes the utility of the median voter (in one special case, when show how to analyze the AA model, establishing that the median voter's preferred tax rate is a Condorcet winner. But this case is not very relevant empirically, since it implies mean income equal to median income, and does not allow for a MeltzerRichard effect.).
